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EPILOGUE
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
In an era of "Court T.V." and in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson trial, the
existence of cameras in the courtroom is a highly debated issue. On January 8,
1996, a hearing of a California Judicial Council task force was held in San Fran-
cisco in which media representatives, California Governor Pete Wilson, and
several Los Angeles judges debated the issue. Currently, due to the Judicial
Council's 1984 rule, camera access at trial is allowed according to each judge's
discretion. Specifically, California Court Rule 980 allows a judge to refuse, limit,
or terminate film or electronic media coverage in the interests of justice, to pro-
tect the rights of the parties and dignity of the court, or to ensure the orderly
conduct of proceedings.
However, Governor Pete Wilson has called for a ban on cameras at criminal
trials. Wilson's office argues that the effect of camera access is to transform a
trial into a form of entertainment which serves to undermine the solemnity and
dignity of the process. A group of Los Angeles Superior Court judges echoed
Wilson's arguments and went even further, calling for a ban on all electronic
coverage of court proceedings. A spokesperson for the judges group observed the
disadvantages of camera access, including the fact that lawyers played to camer-
as, witnesses were distracted, potential witnesses were exposed to inadmissible
evidence, and jurors become reluctant to testify. However, not all judges agree.
In fact, the California Judges Association has not yet taken a formal position on
the issue.
Media representatives voiced their concerns about a camera ban. Such organi-
zations as the Radio and Television News Association of Southern California and
the California Broadcasters Association based their advocacy of camera access
upon the public's right to view its court system at work. They further argued that
there was no evidence that cameras have affected or prolonged trials.
Outside of the hearing, "Court T.V." founder, Steven Brill, is making his
opinion known as well. Brill cautioned against making one aberrant case, the
O.J. Simpson trial, the reason to ban camera access in all other cases. Live cov-
erage, argued Brill, is consistent with the Founding Fathers' principles of de-
mocracy and the nation's deeply rooted tradition of public trials.
On February 22, 1996, the California Judicial Council task force recommend-
ed that cameras be banned from all criminal pretrial proceedings and from most
sessions where a jury is not present. Furthermore, no photographs will be al-
lowed of sidebar conferences, courtroom spectators, jurors and minors who are
suspects, accusers or witnesses. The task force declined to ban cameras at trials
because citizens rely heavily on electronic media for information and because
physically attending trials is too difficult. The task force presented its recom-
mendation to the state Judicial Council, which is scheduled to take a final vote in
1
Michaelis et al.: Epilogue
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
May. Bob Egelko, Media, Wilson, Judges Wrangle Over Cameras in Courts,
SAN DMGO UNION & TRm., Jan. 9, 1996, at B6; Harriet Chiang, Task Force
Debates Merits of Cameras in Court, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1996, at A16; Henry
Weinstein, Court TV Founder Defends Live Trial Coverage; Media, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1996, at 1; Task Force Recommends Limits on Camera Coverage of
Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1996, at 24.
Kathryn Michaelis
THE STATUS OF ENTERTAINMENT LAW ATTORNEYS IN ENTERTAINMENT
The balance of power in Hollywood has changed in the last few decades and
the legal profession is one reason why. In the early years of Hollywood contract
negotiations, attorneys were accustomed to accepting the authority of "studio
moguls." In the last decade or so, this climate has changed. Part of this change
of climate was attributable to the rise of independent production companies and
ownership changes in studios. The shift of power went from the buyer to the
seller - from the studio to the talent. As the power of talent grew among stars,
so did the influence of a group of lawyers who often have long-standing ties to
the "A-list" actors and directors.
Major entertainment law firms have not only helped inflate star salaries, but
have also played less-traditional legal roles. Examples of this reformed role for
the entertainment lawyer include creating movie and television production com-
panies, laying groundwork for satellite television networks, merging entertain-
ment with computer technology, and negotiating contracts when top executives
change studios. Some attorneys even prefer to read scripts for their clients.
Some insiders say that attorneys with top clients are becoming as important to
deal-making in entertainment as some of the biggest agents. The benefits an
entertainment lawyer has over an agent include the confidential nature of their
relationship with their client. Another benefit derives from the fact that attorneys
are more prone to handle increasingly complex contract deals, such as foreign
investment, back-end remuneration, and screen credits. Even many agents now
have law degrees, illustrated by an estimated fifteen percent of the two hundred
agents at the William Morris agency. Robert W. Welkos, Starring in the Biggest
Deals in Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at 1.
Kathryn Michaelis
MOTHER'S PHOTOGRAPHS OF SON: ART OR PORNOGRAPHY?
A controversy has arisen over a mother's photographs of her nude son. Toni
Marie Angeli, a Harvard student, photographed her four year-old son for a class
project entitled "Innocence in Nudity." The thirty-three pictures for the project
portray her son as either completely nude or semi-nude. The boy's genitals are
visible in at least three pictures, and in a few he is urinating beside a playmate.
Another picture was described as a low-angle shot of the naked boy being
dragged across the torso of a clothed adult male.
[Vol. VI:323
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When Angeli took the film to be developed at Zona Photographic Laborato-
ries in East Cambridge, the lab contacted the police. Unlike other states which
have had similar incidents, Massachusetts does not have a law requiring photo
processing labs to report suspicious photos of minors. Despite this, the lab con-
tacted the police. The police arrived when Angeli arrived to pick up her photo-
graphs on November 2, 1995.
Reports of what happened next were disputed, however Angeli was charged
with assault and battery, malicious destruction of property and disorderly con-
duct. Angeli claims to have been the victim of "heavy-handed treatment" during
her arrest. In defending her art, Angeli stated, "I think that the beauty of nudity
in children is its lack of sexuality." The district attorney's office decided not to
press charges on the photographs because no "lascivious intent" was evident.
Angeli was sentenced to jail in February for thirty days for disorderly conduct
and destruction of property after police threatened to take her child and a scuffle
ensued. Brian Macquarrie, Overexposure: Mother's Nude Photos of Boy Get
Negative Reaction, Fr. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 14, 1996, at 6; Harvard
Student Picks Jail in Dispute Over Nude Photos of Son, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1996, at 29.
Kathryn Michaelis
POP ARTIST UNDER FIRE FROM BIBLE BELT COMMUNITY
Oil and gas heir Stanley Marsh, a pop art icon, has recently come under at-
tack. Marsh is known for such visible works of art as burying ten Cadillacs nose
down near the old Route 66 at the angle of Egypt's Great Pyramid. Marsh's
ranch has been referenced in Bruce Springsteen songs, by Charles Kuralt and in
the Los Angeles Hard Rock Cafe.
However, in December of 1995, Marsh was indicted by a grand jury for felo-
ny charges including kidnapping and assault. Marsh is also defending himself in
a related civil suit. The lawsuit alleges Marsh deployed some of his art to lure
adolescent boys into abusive and sexual confrontations. Marsh created a series of
signs with yellow backgrounds and black writing, imitating the authentic govern-
ment-issued road signs. His signs depicted such messages as "You Will Never
Be The Same," "I Love the Touch of Silken Flesh," and "Steal This Sign." The
signs attracted several teenagers in the local, conservative town of Amarillo. It
had become a common practice for teenagers not only to steal the signs, but to
catalog each sign as to where they were taken and when.
The felony charges stemmed from a 1994 incident involving an eighteen year-
old high school student whom Marsh allegedly locked in a chicken coop after
catching him with a stolen sign. Marsh reportedly decided to remedy the situa-
tion himself, allegedly threatening several teenagers with criminal prosecution or
public embarrassment if they did not work for him. Police have launched a sepa-
rate investigation into allegations that Marsh used his collection, the Dynamite
Museum, to lure several youths into sexual encounters. Marsh defenders state
that the suit is a ploy to get Marsh's money, as well as the result of a feud with
1996]
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a local, conservative lawyer who is the father of one of the teenagers involved in
one of the thefts. Jesse Katz, A Case of Art Gone Astray?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1996, at 1.
Kathryn Michaelis
NEW RATINGS SYSTEM IN TV INDUSTRY
On February 29, 1996, the television industry voluntarily agreed to devise a
new ratings system for its programs. Ted Turner of Turner Broadcasting stated
that either the industry needed to do it or it would have been done for them,
given the changed political and social climate towards sex and violence on tele-
vision. Another impetus for the self-imposed rating system was the recently
passed Telecommunications Bill, in which the Federal Communications Com-
mission may have imposed a system by next year if it was not done by the in-
dustry.
Unlike movie rating systems, a rating system for television may prove to be
more challenging. Not only are there more hours of programming, but it is un-
clear whether a rating would apply to an entire series or to each single episode.
Furthermore, Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of Ameri-
ca, stated that the new rating system will probably have more gradations than the
current four for movies: G, PG-13, R, and NC-17.
The industry decided that the networks and stations responsible for putting the
programs on the air will be responsible for rating the programs. Some executives
acknowledged that allowing the networks and stations to rate the programs may
result in inconsistencies. However, Valenti stated that the industry will produce
guidelines for the ratings. Concern has also developed over whether the rating
system would result in more violent and sexual programming as it did with the
movie industry. If such a result does occur, parents may soon have a method to
regulate what their children watch. As a result of the Telecommunications Bill,
television sets will soon have "V-chips" that allow parents to block out objec-
tionable programs. Because all television programs would be encoded with the
new ratings, the V-chip could detect them. The deadline for the new ratings
system is January 1, 1997. William Neikirk, TV Industry to Devise Ratings Sys-
tem, Cm. Tim., Mar. 1, 1996, at 8.
Kathryn Michaelis
ABANDONMENT OF A NAME
An advertising agency used an athlete's name in a television commercial for
an automobile manufacturer without his consent. The advertisement aired during
the 1993 NCAA men's basketball tournament and used the athlete's former
name, Lew Alcindor. The athlete, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, sued the advertising
agency and the auto manufacturer under state and common laws protecting rights
of publicity. The defendants argued the defense of abandonment for two reasons.
First, the athlete had not used his original name since 1971, when he converted
326 [Vol. VI:323
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to Islam and began using his Muslim name "Kareem Abdul Jabbar." Second, he
had not used the name "Lew Alcindor" for commercial purposes in over ten
years.
The Ninth Circuit held that unlike a trademark, a proper name cannot be
abandoned during a person's life, even absent any continued commercial use of
the name. An individual's decision to use a name other than a birth name,
whether the decision is based on religion, marital or personal considerations does
not imply an intent to set aside the birth name or the identity associated with that
name. The court decided that abandonment was not an available defense, and
held that the athlete alleged sufficient facts for a finding of a violation of his
right of publicity. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir.
1996).
Stacy Pappas
PERSONAL MANAGERS MUST BE LICENSED IF THEY PROCURE EMPLOYMENT
FOR ARTIST
Section 1700.5 of the Talent Agencies Act ("Act") provides that "no person
shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first pro-
curing a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner." A "talent agency" is
defined, at section 1700.4(a) of the Act, as "a person or corporation who engages
in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising or attempting to procure em-
ployment or engagements for an artist or artists." The Act was designed to pro-
tect artists, and a talent agent must abide by certain regulations promulgated by
the Labor Commissioner. These regulations include keeping a client trust fund
account, keeping client records, refraining from giving the client false informa-
tion, and avoiding certain payment practices.
Generally, personal managers are not regulated by the Act since their duties
deal with both personal and business matters. However, in Waisbren v. Pepper-
corn, 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995), the Court of Appeals of California upheld the
lower court's ruling that personal managers who only occasionally seek to pro-
cure employment for artists are subject to the Talent Agencies Act.
In that case, plaintiff Brad Waisbren acted as a personal manager for Pepper-
corn Productions, Inc. ("Peppercorn") from 1982-88, pursuant to an oral agree-
ment. Peppercorn specializes in the design and creation of puppets for use in the
entertainment industry and advertising media. Waisbren's duties fell in the areas
of project development, management of business affairs, client relations and
publicity, and casting duties. Incidental to his duties as a personal manager,
Waisbren also procured employment for Peppercorn. After Peppercorn terminated
Waisbren, Waisbren filed suit alleging that he had not been paid in accordance
with the oral agreement. Peppercorn moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the agreement was void because Waisbren performed the functions
of a talent agent without first obtaining a license under the Talent Agencies Act.
Waisbren argued that a license was unnecessary because procuring employment
for Peppercorn was incidental to his duties as a personal manager for the corn-
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pany. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the issue of wheth-
er a personal manager must be licensed under the Talent Agencies Act if he
devotes an incidental portion of his business to the function of a talent agent
procuring employment for an artist.
The court looked to the plain meaning of the Act to determine whether the
Act applies to those who only occasionally procure employment for artists. Ac-
cording to sections 1700.4 and 1700.5 of the Act, if a person engages in the
"occupation" of procuring employment for an artist, then that person would fall
under the regulations of the Act. Plainly, an individual can be engaged in an
"occupation" even if only part-time, and a person can have an "occupation" even
if it is not his sole or principal line of work.
In 1985, the California Entertainment Commission ("Commission") was creat-
ed to study the laws and practices of several states with regard to licensing of
agents and representatives of artists in the entertainment industry. The Commis-
sion considered whether personal managers or anyone else should be allowed to
procure employment for an artist without registering under the Talent Agencies
Act. The Commission concluded that "no person, including personal managers,
should be allowed to procure employment for an artist in any manner or under
any circumstances without being licensed as a talent agent." Anyone who per-
forms the same function as a talent agent should be subject to the same regu-
lations. "Exceptions in the nature of incidental, occasional, or infrequent activi-
ties relating to procuring employment cannot be permitted." The Act provides for
one exception in that an unlicensed person may participate in negotiating an em-
ployment contract as long as he does so "in conjunction with, and at the request
of, a licensed talent agency."
The court held that the contract between the unlicensed agent and the artist
was void because the Act's objective is to prevent improper persons from acting
as talent agents and to regulate the talent agents for the protection of the public
and the artist. As a general rule, where a statute prohibits one from doing an act,
the act is void without regard to whether the statute states the consequences of
noncompliance. Furthermore, the appellate court held that it did not matter that
Waisbren brought his cause of action in tort rather than contract; the oral con-
tract between Waisbren and Peppercorn was void. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Pro-
ductions, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995), cert. denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 1553
(Mar. 14, 1996).
Ann Addis Pantoga
DIsNEY STILL SINGING "WHEN YOU WISH UPON A STAR"
Beebe Bourne ("Bourne"), successor-in-interest to Irving Berlin, Inc., brought
a copyright infringement action against The Walt Disney Company ("Disney")
regarding the use of musical compositions from Snow White and Pinocchio in the
sale of home videos and paid television advertisements. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Disney with
[Vol. VI:323
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respect to the use of the compositions for the sale of home videos and for
Bourne regarding the television advertisements. Bourne appealed and Disney
cross-appealed the judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.
Four agreements between Disney and Berlin/Bourne provided the context for
Disney's rights in using the musical compositions. In a 1933 agreement ("Shorts
Agreement") and its later extensions, Disney assigned to Berlin the copyrights to
the "musical compositions written for and used in connection with the synchro-
nized motion picture comic cartoons of Disney," in exchange for a portion of the
revenues received by Berlin for the commercial marketing of the music. Disney
retained the right to record, perform, license others to perform the music, and to
import or export the recordings; but only in connection with Disney's pictures.
Disney also reserved television rights to the cartoons.
In 1937, when Disney produced its first full-length film, Snow White, it en-
tered into an agreement with Berlin ("Snow White Agreement") in which Disney
assigned the copyrights to eight of its musical compositions to Berlin, again in
exchange for a share of the revenues. Disney did not reserve rights to the com-
positions, but even without an express license, Disney released Snow White to
theaters on a number of occasions without complaint from Berlin or Bourne.
In 1939, the parties entered into another agreement ("Pinocchio Agreement")
in which Disney assigned to Berlin the copyrights to Pinocchio and 1939-40
"shorts," in exchange for royalties. Disney retained the non-exclusive right to
record the said musical compositions, to export the recordings, and to give public
performances of the recordings.
In 1961, Disney sued to reclaim the copyrights to Snow White, Pinocchio and
cartoon compositions. A settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement") granted
Disney a license for performing rights to the compositions in theatrical motion
pictures and television, but no express right to synchronize or fix the compo-
sitions on videocassette.
The district court found that the Snow White agreement was not intended to
be a complete integration of the mutual promises made between Disney and
Berlin, and therefore, the court allowed extrinsic evidence of an implied grant of
a license to be admitted. Bourne was aware, and did not complain, of Disney's
theatrical release and re-release of Snow White and Pinocchio, nor of the theatri-
cal trailers run as "coming attractions" in movie theaters. When You Wish Upon
A Star from Pinocchio was played for almost forty years as the opening and
closing to the Disney weekly television show.
Bourne filed suit against Disney when Disney, following a management
change in 1984, began producing videocassettes of its theater releases. Although
the Snow White Agreement did not contain provisions reverting rights to Disney,
the court found that, in light of surrounding circumstances, the Snow White
Agreement was not intended to be a complete integration of the mutual promises
between the two parties. If the Snow White Agreement was held to its express
wording, Disney would have been left without a right to use the compositions in
the original release or in any subsequent releases, yet until this litigation Disney
continued to use the musical compositions for their original purpose.
1996]
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Although videocassette technology was unknown at the time of the agree-
ments, the court held that Disney's non-exclusive right to record the composi-
tions provided for in the Pinocchio Agreement, as integrated to include the same
provision for Snow White, gave Disney the right to record such music mechani-
cally in any and all other motion pictures to be produced by Disney. The court
believed the term "motion picture" includes a broad genus where the physical
form, such as film, tape and discs is irrelevant. Even in the 1930's, Disney made
available certain short subject cartoons for home viewing. The court concluded
that Disney was licensed by Bourne to exploit the copyrighted compositions in
connection with its motion pictures; therefore, Disney should be able to dispose
of these lawfully made copies in any manner it wishes.
In addition, Disney used the musical compositions for paid advertising of
Disney theme parks and theatrical releases of Pinocchio and Snow White without
obtaining a license from Bourne. The district court, affirmed by the appellate
court, found that Disney infringed Boume's copyrights by using the compositions
in television advertising. Beebe Bourne v. The Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d
Cir. 1995).
Ann Addis Pantoga
"FLYING TOASTERS" Surr DISMISSED
In Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, 886 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
the rock group Jefferson Airplane lost a copyright infringement action involving
the copyright to cover artwork on the rock group's 1973 album, Thirty Seconds
Over Winterland. The cover of that album featured "1950's vintage, two-slice,
rounded toasters with white wings and clocks flying in squadron formation
across the sky." In 1990, software publisher Berkeley Systems, Inc. created a
computer screen saver, After Dark, with a similar toaster image.
Thirty Seconds Over Winterland was registered as a sound recording copyright
in 1973; however, no separate registration was filed for the artwork on the album
cover. Arguing that the artwork had never been registered, Berkeley sought to
dismiss the case. The court held that the registration of sound recordings, on
Copyright Office "Form N", did not include registration of album cover artwork
or liner notes. That form specified that the copyright was for the music alone.
The case was dismissed because the artwork had not been registered.
The owner of the artwork copyright may still register the cover artwork and
refile this suit. Registration is not a prerequisite to copyright protection but is a
prerequisite to initiating a lawsuit. Remedies of actual damages, profits and in-
junctive relief are still available even when infringement occurs before registra-
tion. Copyright registration for Jefferson Airplane album did not include cover
artwork, so federal district court dismisses infringement action against publisher
of "Flying Toasters" computer screen saver, ENT. L. REP., Jan. 1996, Vol. 17,
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